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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 





GLENN, ROBERT E., as Trustee of Carter,  
T.A., Jr. & Carter, Jeanette, et al. ; 
REVOCABLE TRUST, 




OSWAINIO DUNLOP                        
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the District Court 
for the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-05-cv-00145) 
District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 18, 2010)                        
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal arises out of a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of approximately 
3.6 acres of land on St. John in the U.S. Virgin Islands (the “Property”).  
Plaintiff/appellant Robert E. Glenn is the trustee of the T.A. Carter, Jr. and Jeannette W. 
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Carter Joint Revocable Trust, which acquired the Property in the late 1990s.  
Defendant/appellee Oswainio Dunlop, a descendant of the Property’s former owner, 
asserts that the conveyance of the Property to the Trust was invalid and has recorded a 
number of documents against the Property with the St. John Office of the Recorder of 
Deeds, effectively blocking any further sale. 
In September 2005, Glenn filed this suit on behalf of the Trust against Dunlop, 
asserting claims for slander of title, defamation, civil extortion, abuse of process, 
intentional harm to property interest, declaratory judgment, and an injunction, all arising 
out of Dunlop’s actions with respect to the Property.  In a written memorandum opinion 
following a bench trial, the District Court denied the Trust relief on all of its tort claims.  
At the same time, it held that the Trust owns the Property in fee simple absolute and that 
Dunlop has no ownership interest in the Property, that the Trust was entitled to a 
declaratory judgment to that effect, and that the Trust was entitled to an injunction 
compelling Dunlop to remove the documents he has recorded against the Property and 
prohibiting Dunlop from recording additional documents against the Property.  The 
District Court’s judgment enjoined Dunlop from prospectively recording additional 
documents, but it did not order him to remove the previously recorded documents.   
Glenn subsequently moved the District Court to alter or amend the judgment to 
reflect the portion of its opinion related to the removal of the recorded documents and for 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  The District Court denied both motions. 
On appeal, Glenn (1) argues that the District Court erred by omitting from the 
judgment an order requiring Dunlop to remove documents recorded against the Property 
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and in denying Glenn’s request to alter or amend the judgment; (2) challenges the District 
Court’s substantive conclusions with respect to the slander-of-title, defamation, and 
intentional-harm-to-property-interest claims; and (3) contends that the District Court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  Dunlop has not 
filed a brief responding to Glenn’s arguments.1  We will vacate the judgment in part and 
remand for the District Court to (1) revise the judgment to reflect its conclusion regarding 
the scope of injunctive relief; (2) reconsider its analyses of Glenn’s slander-of-title and 
intentional-harm-to-property-interest claims; and (3) revisit Glenn’s motion for attorneys’ 




John J. Henry acquired the Property in 1907.  Henry died intestate and his interest 
in the Property was never probated; as a result, the Property passed to his children and 
grandchildren by intestate succession.  During the 1990s, Guy Henry Benjamin, a 
descendant of Henry’s, arranged to sell the Property to the Trust through a series of 
transactions.  Benjamin collected powers of attorney from several Henry family 
members, including Dunlop’s mother, and conveyed their combined interests to the 
                                                 
1  Dunlop also separately appealed the District Court’s judgment.  We dismissed that 
appeal after Dunlop failed timely to file a brief.   
 
2  The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction to review the Court’s original judgment and its subsequent order denying 
Glenn’s motions to amend or alter the judgment, and for attorneys’ fees, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv); Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 




Trustees of Roanoke College by deed of gift.  The remaining Henry family members 
conveyed their interests to the College by quitclaim deed.  After the College obtained a 
judgment quieting title to the Property from the former Virgin Islands Territorial Court 
(now known as the Superior Court) in 2002, the Trust purchased the Property from the 
College. 
The Trust subsequently contracted to sell all of its holdings on St. John, including 
the Property, for $10.6 million.  After Dunlop learned of the sale contract, he contacted 
the Trust and its representatives, alleging that Benjamin had procured consents to sell the 
Property from Dunlop’s mother and another Henry family member by fraud.  In August 
2005, Dunlop recorded affidavits related to the alleged fraud and other documents against 
the Property.  In September 2005, Glenn responded by filing this case.  Dunlop 
subsequently recorded additional documents, including a notice of lis pendens related to 
this case, against the Property.  The District Court found that the documents Dunlop 
recorded prevented the Trust from closing the sale of its St. John holdings by clouding 
the Trust’s title to the Property. 
In January 2006, Dunlop petitioned the Virgin Islands Superior Court for control 
over Henry’s estate as a means of reasserting the Henry family’s interest in the Property.  
After Roanoke College filed a motion informing the Superior Court that it had quieted 
title to the Property, the Superior Court revoked Dunlop’s status as special administrator 
of the estate.  It ordered that the matter would remain open for thirty days to allow any of 
Henry’s heirs to establish an interest in the Property, after which Dunlop’s petition would 
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be dismissed.  The record does not reflect any further attempt by any Henry family 
member other than Dunlop to assert an interest in the Property. 
II. 
A. The Scope of Injunctive Relief 
Glenn first argues that the District Court erred in issuing a judgment that was 
inconsistent with its written memorandum opinion and in subsequently denying Glenn’s 
motion to alter or amend the judgment to reflect the District Court’s opinion.3
The District Court’s memorandum opinion recognized that Glenn sought a two-
part injunction “to compel Dunlop to discharge and remove the documents Dunlop has 
recorded against the Property and to prohibit Dunlop from recording documents against 
the Property in the future,” Glenn v. Dunlop, No. 2005-145, 2009 WL 482481, at *8 
(D.V.I. Feb. 23, 2009) (emphasis added).  It held that Glenn had satisfied each of the 
required elements for such an injunction, id. at *8-9, and its reasoning, which turned on 
the actual harm the Trust has sustained as a result of the previously recorded documents 
and on the public’s interest in “discouraging individuals from recording baseless 
documents against property,” id. at *9, applies equally to existing and future recorded 
documents.  After conducting a thorough analysis, the District Court concluded that it 
would both “issue an injunction to prohibit Dunlop from recording documents against the 
  We agree.   
                                                 
3  Glenn filed a Motion to Modify Injunction and for Expedited Determination in this 
Court, seeking substantially the same relief as his merits arguments on this issue.  
Because we grant this relief as part of our disposition on the merits above, we will deny 
Glenn’s motion as moot. 
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Property,” id. at *9, and “issue an injunction to compel Dunlop to remove any and all 
documents he has recorded against the Property,” id. at *10. 
Despite the clarity of the District Court’s opinion regarding the scope of the 
injunction, its judgment enjoined Dunlop only “from recording any documents against the 
Property with the Recorder of Deeds,” id. at *10; it did not mention that the documents 
Dunlop recorded in 2005, which remain in the Property’s chain of title, have already 
prevented the Trust from completing one sale of its St. John holdings and have frustrated 
the Trust’s attempts to find other buyers, see id. at *9.  Glenn brought this issue to the 
District Court’s attention in a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the District 
Court summarily denied “without prejudice.”  App. 3039-40. 
The inconsistency between the District Court’s memorandum opinion and its 
original judgment makes no sense, and it did not provide any explanation for its refusal to 
alter or amend the judgment.  We will reverse the Court’s denial of Glenn’s motion to 
alter or amend, and will remand for it to revise the judgment to conform to its opinion by 
ordering Dunlop to remove any and all documents he has recorded against the Property.4
B. Slander of Title 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that, to prevail on a slander-of-title 
claim, a plaintiff must show:  “‘a) falsity of the statement; b) injury to pecuniary interests, 
such as property, products, or business; c) publication to a third person; d) special harm 
                                                 
4  Glenn also asks us to order the District Court to enter an injunction compelling the St. 
John Recorder of Deeds to remove the recorded documents.  Such an order would be 




in the form of actual pecuniary loss; and e) intent, malice, or fault to cause harm.’”5
The District Court concluded that Glenn failed to establish the first, “falsity of the 
statement” prong, after finding that (1) Glenn “failed to present any evidence 
demonstrating that Dunlop entertained doubts about the truth of the documents he filed 
against the Property”; (2) “Dunlop had a good faith belief that he was protecting what he 
thought was his family’s interest in the Property”; and (3) “given Glenn’s election not to 
call Dunlop as a witness, there is absolutely no evidence of Dunlop’s state of mind.”  Id. 
at *3. 
  
Glenn, 2009 WL 482481, at *3 (citations omitted).  The District Court concluded that 
Glenn failed to prove the “falsity of the statement” and “actual pecuniary loss” prongs of 
his claim.  Id. at *3-4.  We agree with Glenn that the District Court’s analysis both 
reflects an unnecessarily cramped view of the law and failed to consider all of the 
relevant evidence. 
Each of these three findings is flawed.  First, to establish his slander-of-title claim, 
Glenn does not need to establish that Dunlop actually “‘entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of his publication,’” id. at *3 (quoting Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 
F.2d 433, 435 (3d Cir. 1971) (emphasis omitted)); that heightened standard applies to 
claims involving libel against public figures, i.e., “those who thrust themselves, either 
through political action or other activity which invokes public interest or concern, into the 
public limelight,” Grove, 438 F.2d at 435.  In a straightforward slander-of-title claim, like 
                                                 
5  Under Virgin Islands law, restatements of the law provide “the rules of decision in the 
courts of the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws to 
the contrary.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4. 
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this one, the Restatement provides that a defendant’s “reckless disregard” for a 
statement’s truth or falsity provides a sufficient basis for liability.  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 623A cmt. d.  Thus, the District Court erred in concluding that a failure to 
establish that Dunlop entertained actual doubts about the truth of the documents he filed 
disposed of Glenn’s claim.   
Second, the District Court’s reliance on Dunlop’s subjective, “good faith belief” as 
evidence that Glenn failed to establish liability is misplaced.  As Glenn points out, the 
Restatement employs an objective reasonableness standard, so that the publisher of a 
false statement may be found liable if he “know[s] enough of the circumstances so that he 
should as a reasonable man recognize the likelihood that some third person will act in 
reliance upon his statement, or that it will otherwise cause harm to the pecuniary interests 
of the other because of the reliance.”  Id. § 623A cmt. b; see also id. § 624 (indicating 
that liability for slander of title arises from “publication of a false statement disparaging 
another’s property rights in land . . . that the publisher should recognize as likely to result 
in pecuniary harm to the other” (emphasis added)).  In other words, the question is not 
whether Dunlop was motivated in part by a sense that he was protecting his family’s 
interests in the Property, but whether he should have realized that, by recording 
documents against the Property, he likely would harm the Trust.   
Moreover, and equally importantly, the District Court’s conclusion that Dunlop 
was motivated by a “good faith belief” to protect his family’s interest conflicts with the 
testimony of several witnesses, including Sandra Ferris, who assists the Trust with real 
estate matters, and Brion Morrisette, one of the Trust’s lawyers, that Dunlop demanded 
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millions of dollars from the Trust in exchange for a promise not to record documents 
against the Property.  But the District Court’s opinion does not even mention that 
testimony.  On remand, it should explain how this evidence concerning Dunlop’s 
attempts to extract payments from the Trust in exchange for foregoing his claims to the 
Property factors into its analysis. 
Third, the District Court’s assertion that the record contained “no evidence of 
Dunlop’s state of mind” as a result of “Glenn’s election not to call Dunlop as a witness” 
fails to note the important fact that, after seeking and obtaining the District Court’s 
permission, Glenn designated portions of Dunlop’s deposition testimony as part of his 
case-in-chief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(3).  Portions of the designated 
testimony suggest that Dunlop specifically intended to thwart the Trust’s planned sale of 
its St. John holdings.  This evidence bears both on Dunlop’s “state of mind” and on the 
questions of whether he acted with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of his 
statements and whether he recognized or should have recognized that his actions were 
likely to cause the Trust pecuniary harm.   Therefore, like the testimony of the other 
witnesses discussed above, it must be considered as part of the overall analysis of 
Glenn’s slander-of-title claim.   
With regard to the “actual pecuniary loss” prong of Glenn’s slander-of-title claim, 
the District Court concluded that Glenn’s “evidence showing that Dunlop’s recorded 
documents clouded the Property’s title,” and “evidence of future pecuniary harm,” were 
insufficient to establish the degree of pecuniary harm required to prove his claim.  Glenn, 
2009 WL 482481, at *4.  This conclusion is at odds with the Restatement, which 
10 
 
specifically cites “impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement” as a type 
of pecuniary loss that satisfies this element of a slander-of-title claim and explains that 
“[t]he most usual manner in which a third person’s reliance upon disparaging matter 
causes pecuniary loss is by preventing a sale to a particular purchaser.”  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 633(1)(a) & cmt. c.   
Applying that standard, it would seem that Glenn actually has proved this element 
of his claim:  according to the District Court, “Glenn has adduced evidence that Dunlop’s 
recorded documents have impeded the Trust from selling the Property,” including 
“evidence . . . that the Trust’s contract for the sale of the Property to a third party[] was 
terminated because of Dunlop’s recorded documents” and “evidence . . . that the Trust 
has since been unable to find another buyer for the Property because of those 
documents,” 2009 WL 482481, at *9.  But because the Court is in the best position to 
apply the correct standard to the totality of the evidence presented in the case, we will 
vacate the judgment on the slander-of-title claim and remand so that it may consider the 
lost sale, and reconsider its overall analysis, in light of this opinion. 
C. Defamation 
The District Court held that Glenn failed to establish his defamation claim because 
he did not establish that “Dunlop made a false or defamatory statement about the Trust or 
himself.”  Id. at *4.  On appeal, Glenn argues that a notice of lis pendens pertaining to 
this case that Dunlop filed against the Property constitutes a form of defamation.  His 
theory is that the notice impugns Glenn’s and the Trust’s reputations by suggesting that 
they are attempting to sell land they do not own.  We disagree.  The lis pendens notice 
11 
 
does not imply anything sinister or untrue about Glenn or the Trust; it simply provides 
notice of a legal disagreement regarding title to the Property.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment with respect to Glenn’s defamation claim. 
D. Intentional Harm to Property Interest 
The District Court held that Glenn failed to establish his claim for intentional harm 
to property interest (also known as a “prima facie tort” claim) because it found that the 
evidence at trial “did not establish that Dunlop’s sole purpose in recording documents 
against the Property was to injure Glenn or the Trust”; instead, “all signs indicate that 
Dunlop’s motivation in investigating his family’s purported interest in the Property was 
to safeguard that interest.”  2009 WL 482481, at *7.   
Leaving aside the question of whether the record supports those findings 
(discussed in connection with the slander-of-title claim above), the District Court applied 
an improperly burdensome legal standard to Glenn’s claim.  The Restatement provides 
that the “intent” element of the offense is satisfied where the defendant (1) desires to 
bring about harm as a consequence of his act, or (2) knows or believes that harm is 
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his actions, Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 870 cmt. b; it does not require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted solely out of 
an intent to harm.6
                                                 
6  The District Court cited another case from the District of the Virgin Islands in which 
the court quoted and applied the “sole motivation” requirement to a prima facie tort 
claim.  See 2009 WL 482481, at *6 (quoting Gov’t Guarantee Fund of Republic of 
Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 463 (D.V.I. 1997)).  That case does not control 
our analysis, however, because it relied in part on New York law, which has adopted 
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At the same time, however, we note that prima facie tort claims typically provide 
relief only where the defendant’s conduct “does not come within the requirements of one 
of the well established and named intentional torts.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 870 cmt. a.  In keeping with this principle, courts in the Virgin Islands have dismissed 
prima facie tort claims that they deem insufficiently “distinct” from plaintiffs’ other, 
more established tort claims.  See, e.g., Moore v. A.H. Riise Gift Shops, 659 F. Supp. 
1417, 1426 (D.V.I. 1987); Gov’t Guarantee Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 
955 F. Supp. 441, 463 (D.V.I. 1997) (“[N]o claim for prima facie tort lies if the action 
complained of fits within another category of tort.” (citation omitted)).  In this case, there 
appears to be significant potential for overlap between the slander-of-title and prima facie 
tort claims.  Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment on the intentional-harm-
to-property-interest claim and remand for the District Court to determine whether it 
duplicates the slander-of-title claim.  In other words, to the extent that the District Court 
determines that Glenn is entitled to relief on the slander-of-title claim, it should deny 





                                                                                                                                                             
more stringent standards for liability on prima facie tort claims than the Restatement 
requires.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 cmt. a. 
 
7  If the District Court determines that Glenn is not entitled to relief on the slander-of-title 




E. Attorneys’ Fees 
The District Court denied Glenn’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in a 
summary ruling “without prejudice.”  App. 3039-40.  We conclude that this was an abuse 
of discretion.   
At the outset, we note (but do not decide) that it seems likely that Glenn was 
entitled to recover at least some of his fees:  Virgin Islands law specifically provides that 
a “prevailing party” is entitled to attorneys’ fees, see V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5 § 541(b), and 
cases interpreting that provision have allowed plaintiffs to recover fees even if they did 
not obtain all of the relief they sought, see, e.g., Ingvoldstat v. Kings Wharf Island 
Enters., No. 1983/86, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13112, at *4 (D.V.I. Oct. 4, 1983) (“[I]t is 
settled law that as long as a plaintiff achieves some of the benefits sought in maintaining 
a lawsuit, even though that plaintiff does not ultimately succeed in securing the judgment 
sought, the plaintiff can be considered the prevailing party for purposes of a fee award.” 
(citation omitted)).   
At a minimum, “it is incumbent upon a district court to make its reasoning and 
application of the fee-awards jurisprudence clear, so that we, as a reviewing court, have a 
sufficient basis to review for abuse of discretion.”  Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 
223 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).  The District Court did not do so here:  its order does 
not apply the law or provide any explanation for its decision to deny the motion for 
attorneys’ fees.  Therefore, we will vacate the Court’s order denying Glenn’s motion for 





For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment on the 
injunction claim and its order denying Glenn’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, 
and will remand for the Court to revise the scope of the injunction to conform to its 
opinion.  We will vacate the Court’s judgment with respect to Glenn’s slander-of-title and 
intentional-harm-to-property-interest claims, and will remand so that it may reconsider 
those claims in light of this opinion.  We also will vacate the Court’s order denying 
Glenn’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and remand for further proceedings on 
Glenn’s motion consistent with this opinion.  We will affirm the Court’s judgment with 
respect to the defamation claim. 
